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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
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by
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Professor Lorraine Bahrick, Major Professor

Twenty-four 7.5- to 8-month old infants were presented
with two manipulanda and given either behavior-contingent or
noncontingent experience with an object.

Infants

in the

contingent group learned and remembered the controlling
action for up to 1 week

(L(11)=2.83, p<.05),

whereas those

in the noncontingent group showed no preference for either
action.

There was no evidence of memory, however, for the

familiar object by either group.

This surprising finding

may be a result of greater interest in the action than in
the object.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Contingency awareness by human infants was originally
investigated by John S. Watson.

Watson

(1966) proposed that

contingency awareness is a necessary condition for learning,
and that human infants are born with the adaptive ability to
perceive contingencies.

Since Watson's seminal article,

many researchers have investigated the role of contingency
perception in infant development.

This paper provides an

overview of the contingency literature and presents findings
from a recent research project on infants' memory for
contingencies.
Chapter 2 begins with an overview of infants' affective
responses to contingencies, followed by a description of
several studies that demonstrate the young infant's ability
to detect and learn behavior-contingent relationships.

The

literature review then turns to the matter of how infants
learn behavior-contingent relationships.

Two primary areas

of research are addressed in answering these questions,
visual contiguity of contingent stimuli and schedules of
reinforcement.

Next, the literature on memory for

contingencies is reviewed.
literature

Though limited in scope, this

indicates that infants have the ability to

remember behavior-contingent relationships over extended
periods of time.

Finally, several studies are reviewed that

1

indicate that infants can learn behavior-contingent
relationships via imitation.

The literature is then

summarized in Chapter 3, and the thesis of the current
research project is introduced.
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical rationale for the
current research project, followed by the methodology.
Consistent with Watson's position, this thesis maintains
that contingency perception is ethologically significant and
thus is crucial to normal infant development.
of the study are presented in Chapter 5.

The results

Finally, Chapter 6

integrates the current findings with the existing literature
and suggests new directions for research.
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Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Cause-and-effect events surround the infant daily.

Most

cause-and-effect events occur independent of the infant's
behavior and will be inconsequential for him/her.

Other

events may be contingent on the infant's behavior, and their
outcomes may be important to the infant's adaptation in
his/her environment.

It seems logically adaptive then for

the infant to learn which events he/she can control and how.
For example, an infant will cry when experiencing discomfort
or hunger, alerting his mother that something is wrong.

As

language is acquired, children learn that specific words
often produce the fulfillment of certain needs.

Imagine the

fate of an organism who is incapable of learning and
remembering response-contingent relationships.

This

organism would likely have difficulty adapting to its
environment.
Affective Responses to Contingencies
Mineka, Gunnar and Champoux (1986) demonstrated the
importance of having control over one's environment in a
study with rhesus monkeys.

Results showed that

monkeys, who could control the delivery of

"master"

food, water, and

treats, displayed less fear and more exploratory behavior of
a mechanical toy than did monkeys who received edibles noncontingently.

These results are supported by Mason
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(1978)

who reported that using dogs as surrogates for rhesus
monkeys was less detrimental than inanimate surrogates.

The

author suggests that amelioration of detrimental effects may
be attributed to response-contingent stimulation provided by
surrogate dogs.
Similar results have been shown in 12infants

(Gunnar-Vongnechten, 1978).

to 13-month-old

Control over a

potentially frightening toy reduced fear responses in male
subjects and increased positive affect in male and female
subjects.

Half of the 24 male and 24

female subjects were

randomly assigned to a controlling condition or a
noncontrolling condition.

The potentially-frightening

stimulus was a mechanical cymbal-clapping monkey.

Infants

in the controlling condition were trained during a
familiarization phase to hit a panel on a tray before them
in order to activate a toy merry-go-round.

Infants in the

noncontrolling condition experienced similar familiarization
with the toy merry-go-round, but were not trained with the
panel.

During the test phase the merry-go-round was

replaced by the monkey.

Each group was then exposed to the

monkey under its respective condition.

Controlling infants

were able to activate the monkey at will while
noncontrolling infants had no control.

Subjects in the

noncontrolling condition were yoked to subjects in the
controlling condition in order to equate groups on the
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number of stimulus activations.

Thus, each noncontrolling

infant received the same number of stimulus activations, at
the same intervals, as were generated by the previous
controlling infant.

Measures of positive affect responses,

proximity to the toy and touching the toy, as well as the
number of toy activations for controlling infants, provided
an index of the infants' positive responses to the stimulus.
Fright was indexed by fussing and crying, support

looks to

Results indicated

the mother and closeness to the mother.

that infants in the controlling group responded
significantly more positively to the monkey, as indexed by
smiling, laughing and approaching, than did noncontrolling
infants.

However, only the male infants showed

significantly greater amounts of negative affect in the
noncontrolling condition than in the controlling condition.
It was concluded that reaction of 1-year-olds to an arousing
event is a function of their control over it.
no control produced fearful
(for females),

(for males),

Thus, having

or at least neutral

responses, while control produced positive

responses for both males and females.

This study indicates

that even a potentially distressing event can produce a
positive affective outcome in infants when it is contingent
upon their behavior.
Lewis, Sullivan and Brooks-Gunn
results in 10-,

(1985) found parallel

16- and 24-week-olds under a contingent
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reinforcement condition.

Subjects were assigned to either a

contingent condition, in which arm movements were reinforced
with audio-visual stimuli, or a noncontingent control group.
For infants in both groups, sessions lasted as long as they
remained interested and did not fuss or cry.

Affective

measures showed that subjects in the contingent condition
had longer sessions and fussed/cried less than did the
noncontingent control subjects.

Subjects at 16 and 24 weeks

of age also smiled more under contingent stimulation than
noncontingent controls of the same age.

Interestingly, the

fuss/cry response decreased with age for contingent subjects
Based on

and increased with age for noncontingent subjects.
these results, the authors suggest that contingent

stimulation may produce a child who is more involved and
interested in the environment, which may in turn promote
subsequent competence.

Speculation aside, this study

indicates that contingent stimulation contributes to longer
task involvement and promotes positive affect.

Age

differences on affective measures indicated that the effects
of contingent versus noncontingent stimulation intensified
from 10 to 24 weeks of age.
Watson and Ramey

(1969

in Watson, 1971)

also found an

increase in positive affect in 2-month-old infants under
conditions of response-contingent reinforcement.

Subjects

in the experimental group could cause a mobile, suspended
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above their cribs, to turn for one second by making head
movements against a pressure-sensitive pillow.

Control

subjects were exposed to either a noncontingently moving
mobile or one that remained stabile.

Subjects in all

conditions were exposed to the stimuli for 10 minutes each
day over a 14-day period.

Results showed that experimental

subjects significantly increased backward head movements
while control subjects did not, indicating that experimental
subjects learned that they could control the mobile.
Additionally, experimental subjects displayed vigorous
smiling and cooing toward the mobiles after the third day of
exposure to the contingent reinforcement.

This socio-

emotional response was not displayed by infants in the
control groups.

These results indicate that contingency

perception is often accompanied by positive affect.
Gunnar

(1980) compared the effects of predictability

and control on infants' responses to an arousing, fearprovoking toy. Twelve-month-old infants were assigned to one
of three conditions;
controlling.

controlling, predicting or non-

Infants in the controlling condition could

simultaneously activate a potentially frightening toy and a
bell.

Infants in the predicting condition could not control

the activation of the toy, but the bell always sounded
first, thus acting as a predictor for the activation of the
toy.

Infants in the non-controlling condition had no
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control over the toy and were not provided with the warning
bell.

Affect was assessed by the frequency and intensity of

fuss/cry and laugh/smile responses.

Results showed that

infants in the controlling condition approached the toy
significantly more than did infants in either the predicting
or noncontrolling conditions.

Only infants in the

controlling condition displayed little distress upon the toy
being activated and they explored it more than did the other
two groups.

Infants in the predicting condition showed as

much distress and as little exploration of the toy as did
infants in the non-controlling condition.

Thus,

predictability did not significantly reduce negative
responses to the toy's activation, while having control did.
Finally, Levitt

(1980) found that 10-month-old infants

had more positive affective responses to a stranger if they
could control the strangers initial appearance than if they
could not.

In Phase

1, subjects in the 'contingent'

condition, could produced the appearance of the stranger
from behind an occluder by touch a cylinder.

In two

'noncontingent' conditions, the stranger appeared either
frequently or infrequently, but her appearance was not
controlled by the infant.

The infant's affective responses

were then recorded in a Phase 2 during a
procedure and a free-play situation.

"stranger approach"

During Phase 1 only

subjects in the contingent condition showed an increase in
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the frequency of touching the cylinder, indicating that they
learned the behavior-contingent relationship.

The results

of Phase 2 indicated that infants in the contingent
condition responded more positively

(e.g., smiles,

vocalizations and visual orientation) to the stranger when
the stranger was at a distance and less negatively (e.g.,
crying, whimpering and postural or visual avoidance) when
the stranger was near than subjects in the two noncontingent
conditions.

Infants in the contingent condition were also

more tolerant of the stranger's intrusions than infants in
the other two groups.

Levitt

(1985) suggests that

contingent experience may mediate the development of social
relationships.
The studies cited above suggest that infants prefer
situations which they can control.

Results indicate that

control over an event is comforting and promotes exploratory
behavior more than uncontrollable events.
reduces negative affect,

Because control

as well as promoting positive

affect and interaction with stimuli

might therefore facilitate learning.

in the environment, it

It seems reasonable to

propose that the ability to detect contingencies,
particularly as they relate to our own behavior, is an
adaptive skill.

Thus,

learning which situations are

contingent upon our behavior and which are not may be
important for survival.

At a minimum, it would allow us to
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manipulate our environment in a way that would maximize the
occurrence of positive events and minimize negative ones.
The above studies point to the importance of examining
the dynamics of contingency perception in infants.

Perhaps

by determining what properties specify contingencies we can
better understand how infants are able to perceive their
control over contingent events.
The remainder of this review will provide evidence for
which contingent relationships infants are capable of
perceiving and what factors contribute to or inhibit this
process.

Furthermore, it will provide an understanding of

how infants learn they have control over contingent events.
Contingency Perception
Watson

(1967) showed that the visual fixation behavior

of 14-week-olds could be influenced by contingent
reinforcement.

Infants were placed face-up in a bassinet

with a black ceiling containing two translucent circles,
located laterally to the infants' right and left.

Infants

could control discrete reinforcements, which consisted of a
tone or lighting of the target circle, by fixating on the
appropriate circle.

Infants showed a significant increase

in the rate of visual fixation on the designated circle.
This demonstrates that 14-week-old infants can learn that
performing a particular response will produce a reinforcing
stimulus.
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Watson and Ramey

(1969, in Watson 1971) also found that

infants as young as 8 weeks of age can learn to control the
movement of a mechanical mobile suspended above their crib.
The 2-month-old infants were exposed to the mobile for 10
minutes per day, for two weeks.

The infants in a contingent

condition could cause the mobile to turn for one second by
applying backward head pressure to a pressure-sensitive
pillow.

Results showed that infants who could control the

mobile increased their response rate significantly above
baseline levels across the two-week period, while infants
who had no control did not.
These studies with 8- and 14-week-old subjects show that
infants can perceive contingent relationships at a very
young age.

Also, once a contingency is learned, infants

tend to engage in the controlling behavior at a higher rate
than they would when the contingent relationship does not
exist.
Rovee and Rovee

(1969) used a conjugate reinforcement

paradigm to test 9- to 12-week-old infants' exploratory
behavior.

Under conjugate reinforcement infants were able

to control the frequency, duration and intensity of the
motion of a mobile

(which was suspended above their cribs)

via a cord connecting the mobile to one of their feet.

For

example, if the infant kicked his/her foot vigorously three
times

in five seconds, the mobile would shake vigorously
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three times in five seconds.

This differs from the

discrete reinforcement employed by Watson in that

infants

can only control frequency of reinforcement under discrete
conditions.

Thus, conjugate reinforcement provides

immediate stimulus feedback that is congruent to the target
behavior.
The paradigm used by Rovee and Rovee

(1969) consisted of

a training session composed of three phases;
baseline period in which the operant level of

1)

a 27-minute

foot-kicking

is established, 2) a 15-minute acquisition phase with
conjugate reinforcement, 3) a 5-minute extinction phase.
The phases were separated by 2-minute intervals.

Results

showed that infants in the conjugate reinforcement condition
increased their response rate threefold after three minutes
of conjugate reinforcement.

Subjects in a noncontingent,

but otherwise identical condition
moved the mobile),

(in which an experimenter

showed no increase in foot-kicking rate.

This indicates that infants have memory for contingent
events and will choose to produce events when given the
opportunity.

Furthermore, the dramatic increase in foot-

kicking rate by subjects who received conjugate
reinforcement suggests that contingent events are highly
rewarding.
The above research on contingency perception has focused
on whether infants perceive and learn contingent
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relationships.

A more intriguing and implied question is

how do infants know they have control;

what cognitive

mechanisms might be at work in cuing the infant?
to this question is temporal contiguity.

One answer

The literature

suggests that infants come to perceive their control over an
event when they have repeatedly experienced that event
following a particular behavior
& Rovee, 1969).

This implies,

that when they do R,

(Watson, 1972 & 1967;

Rovee

simply, that infants learn

S will happen.

However, studies

discussed below will show that temporal contiguity is a
necessary but not sufficient component for responsecontingent connections to be made by infants.

Other factors

contribute to the infants' ability to learn that a
contingent relationship exists between an event and their
behavior, as well as to identify the particular target
behavior.

These factors, discussed below, include visual

contiguity and schedule of reinforcement.
Visual Contiguity and Contingency Perception
Visual displacement of stimuli, relative to the infant's
line of sight, is a second factor which influences
contingency perception.

Studies in this area provide

further explanation of how contingency perception might
develop.
Millar and Schaffer

(1972) studied the effects of visual

discontiguity between an operantly activated stimulus and
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the controlling manipulandum on contingency perception in 69- and 12-month-old infants.

A perforated canister served

as the manipulandum in three conditions.
placed before the subjects.

The canister was

By touching the canister the

infants could activate the stimuli under conditions of 0,
or 60 degrees of lateral displacement.

5,

In the zero

displacement group, colored lights and tones emanated from
inside the canister upon activation.

In the two

displacement groups, the audio-visual stimulus was emitted
by a duplicate canister that was displaced either 5 or 60
degrees from the manipulated canister.
Results showed that 6-month-old infants were unable to
learn the task when the response contingent stimulus was
displaced 60 degrees from the manipulandum, just outside of
the infants' visual field.

However, with only 5 or 0

degrees of visual displacement, where both the manipulandum
and the feedback stimulus were within the visual field, 6month-olds successfully learned the contingency.
12-month-olds were able to learn under 0-,
displacement conditions.

Thus,

Nine- and

5- and 60-degree

6-month-olds seem to require

visual contiguity between a stimulus and its controlling
manipulandum in order to detect a contingency and learn an
operant task.

By 9 months of age, infants are able to learn

contingencies despite such visual discontiguity.

This

indicates a broadening of contingency perception with age.
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Cavanagh and Davidson

(1977) also found that 6-month-

olds were unable to acquire an operant response when the
visual component of a contingent audio-visual
displaced.

stimulus was

In this study a colored light display and a tone

were located directly behind a clear plexiglass panel, which
served as the manipulandum for infants in a nondisplacement
condition.

In the second condition the visual component of

the stimulus was displaced 60 degrees to the left of the
panel.

Infants

in the non-displacement condition were able

to learn the contingency while infants in the 60-degree
displacement group could not.
One caution should be noted when interpreting the
results of this study.

The audio component of the stimulus

was located directly above the infants in all conditions.
This was done to cue the infants to the visual stimulus,
which was directly in front of them during the contiguous
condition.

It is possible that in the 60-degree visual

displacement condition the audio cue confused or misoriented
the infants, thereby confounding the results by producing
competing tendencies to look in two directions at once.
However, Millar

(1985) found the same results in a study

with 6- and 12-month-olds.

In this study the audio and

visual components were contained within the feedback
stimulus, thus they were jointly displaced.

Again, 6-month-

olds were unable to learn a contingency under a 60-degree
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visual displacement condition, while 12-month-olds acquired
the operant response.
Another study by Millar

(1974) lends support to the idea

that 6-month-olds' inability to learn under a 60-degree
displacement condition may be associated with their memory
system.

In this study, the manipulandum was directly in

line with a translucent screen, behind which was a set of
lights.

Touching the screen caused the lights to turn on.

Thus, the lights were only visible while they were providing
immediate feedback.

In the

"cue-assisted" condition a

plastic ring circumscribed the area where the feedback would
occur.

In the

"no-cue" condition the plastic ring was not

present, thus there was nothing marking the area where the
lights were.

Results showed that 9-month-olds learned the

contingency under both conditions while 6-month-olds learned
only under the cued condition.
6-month-olds need a

The authors concluded that

"visual holding cue" during the inter-

response interval in order to learn the contingency.

Thus,

visual contiguity between the manipulandum and the feedback
source appears to be an important factor in contingency
perception in infants up to 6 months of age.
Results generated by 9- and 12-month-olds suggest at
least two possible explanations for why 6-month-olds may not
be successful at contingency perception in the absence of
visual contiguity.

First, this research suggests that
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displacement of the response-contingent stimulus outside of
the visual field may impose greater demands on the infant's
information storage and recall system.

In order for an

infant to learn the relationship between manipulating an
object before him and the subsequent activation of a
stimulus outside of his field of vision, the infant must do
two things;

1) While

looking at the manipulandum he must

store some type of information about the feedback stimulus
and be able to recall it in order to remember to turn
towards it for reinforcement upon making the operant
response;

2) While focusing on the feedback stimulus, the

infant must store information about the manipulandum and be
able to recall that it is the means through which he/she can
reactivate the stimulus.

It

is possible that 6-month-olds'

memory storage and retrieval systems are not sufficiently
developed to facilitate this process, while that of 9- and
12-month-olds are sufficiently advanced.

This explanation,

however, seem unlikely.
A

second possibility is that of differential attention

strategies between the two age groups.

Millar and Schaffer

(1973) observed that 9-month-olds tended to focus on the
feedback stimulus while continuing to touch the
manipulandum.
olds.

This behavior was not typical of the 6-month-

Consequently, 6-month-olds may not attend to the

stimulus and manipulandum simultaneously, preventing them
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from learning the contingency.
To summarize, research supports the notion that for
infants as old as 6 months of age, visual contiguity between
stimulus and manipulandum is necessary for acquisition of an
operant response in a contingency task.
(Millar, 1974)

one study

However, at least

suggests that visual holding cues,

in the absence of visual contiguity, can facilitate response
acquisition in 6-month-olds.

By 9 months of age infants are

able to overcome the difficulties of a 60-degree
displacement of the contingent stimulus either through a
more developed memory system or more effective attention
strategies.
Schedules of Reinforcement and Contingency Learning
Another factor which influences the learning of a
contingent relationship is the rate and schedule at which
infants'

responses

are reinforced.

Watson

(1972)

presented

2-month-old infants with contingent and noncontingent
discrete reinforcements across a 14-day period when they
produced foot motions of sufficient intensity to activate a
pressure-sensitive pillow.
minute sessions daily;

The infants experienced two 10-

one session was run under the

contingent condition and the other under the noncontingent
condition.

This procedure produced an initial increase in

activity and response rate followed by a progressive decline
in both across contingent and noncontingent sessions.
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Results suggest that alternating contingent and
noncontingent reinforcement interferes with contingency
perception.
Watson further explored the effects of partial
reinforcement on contingency perception in another
experiment.

Reinforcement was provided either 40 percent or

60 percent of the time contingent on infants' backward head
pressure to their pillow.

Results showed that under neither

condition did 8-week-old infants learn the contingent
relationship between their behavior and the mobile's
movement.

Thus, 8-week-old infants need a rate of

reinforcement higher than 60 percent in order to learn a
behavior-contingent relationship.

Unfortunately, this study

did not pinpoint the minimum rate of reinforcement necessary
for 8-week-olds to learn a contingency.
Interestingly, Watson

(1979) found that reinforcement of

behaviors that occur at extremely high rates can also
interfere with an infant's ability to perceive
contingencies.

Eight-week-old infants were exposed to a

response-contingent mobile reinforcer for 10 minutes per
day, for seven days.

Pressure-sensitive pillows were placed

under subjects' legs so that sufficient leg movement would
cause the mobile to turn for one second.
received identical conditions.

Two groups

However, the pillows were

differentially calibrated so that the one used in group B
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was twice as sensitive to pressure as the one used in group
A.

Group A showed a steady increase in response rate and

smiling behavior over the seven-day period, relative to
baseline.

However, group B showed no increase in response

rate or smiling over that same period.

These results

suggest that reinforcement of the higher frequency behavior
hindered infants' ability to learn the contingency.

This is

consistent with Watson's proposal that the probability that
a subject will respond is greater at lower contingency
magnitudes as compared to extremely high magnitudes
1979).

(Watson,

One reason for this may be that when an event

is

contingent upon a very frequent behavior, it is likely that
other behaviors will occur simultaneously.

Thus, infants

may not be able to isolate the controlling behavior.
Millar and Watson

(1979) studied the effects of delayed

reinforcement on contingency behavior in 6- to 8-month-old
infants.

Infants' wide arm movements were audio-visually

reinforced with lights and tones under one of four
conditions,

immediate reinforcement, 3-,

delayed reinforcement.

6-,

or 10-second

In all groups delayed feedback

failed to produce a significant increase in responding
relative to baseline measures.

Infants in the

immediate

reinforcement group were able to learn the contingency and
significantly increased their response rates above baseline
measure.
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However, Reeve, Reeve, Brown, Brown and Poulson
were able

to successfully train

(1992)

three 4- to 6-month-old

infants to learn a behavior-contingent relationship using a
multiple-baseline across subjects design.

The 12-minute

conditioning sessions took place three or four times per
week over a three month period.

During the sessions, each

infant was seated facing a panel with a window shade.
infant's mother was seated behind the shade.

The mother's

appearance was contingent on infant vocalizations.
levels of vocalizations were first assessed.

The

Baseline

Following

baseline subjects experienced an alternating DRO and delayed
reinforcement phases.
reinforcement of

DRO consisted of providing immediate

infant behaviors other than vocalizations

with the appearance of the mother.

The first phase after

baseline was a DRO phase for all three subjects.

The

delayed reinforcement phases consisted of reinforcing infant
vocalizations with the appearance of the mother only after a
3-second delay.

The data revealed that all three infants

showed consistently higher rates of vocalizations during the
delayed reinforcement phases than during the DRO phases.
These findings suggest that with sufficient training infants
can learn a behavior-contingent relationship despite a
three-second delay of reinforcement.
These studies point out several factors that are
important in contingency perception.
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First, if an event is

alternately contingent and noncontingent, it tends to
interfere with contingency perception.

Though infants might

initially detect the relationship over repeated exposure to
the inconsistent event, their response rate declines.

Also,

reinforcement rates of 60 percent or less prevent 2-montholds from perceiving the contingency between their behavior
and a subsequent event.

A

third important finding addressed

the effect of delayed reinforcement on contingency
perception.

Six- to 8-month-old infants have been shown to

be unable to detect contingencies if the contingent
reinforcement is delayed by three or more seconds.

Perhaps

during initial learning, memory for the feedback-producing
behavior is limited to less than three seconds.

One

possibility is that intervening behaviors inhibit infants'
ability to associate the controlling behavior with the
contingent event if there is a delay of three or more
seconds.

However, with extensive operant training, 4-

to 6-

month-old infants can overcome a three-second delay
condition and learn the behavior-contingent relationship.
Finally, very high rates of contingent stimulation has
also been found to inhibit contingency perception in
infants.

This finding suggests that when high frequency

behaviors are reinforced, infants are unable to perceive the
relationship between their behavior and the contingent
event.

Perhaps, this is because the event seems to occur by
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chance, since they cannot isolate the controlling response.
Memor

for Contingencies

Though the developmental literature is replete with
studies

of infants'

memory for features of objects,

have addressed infants' memory for events.

very few

Fewer still have

investigated infants' memory for contingent relationships
over time.

There is, however, one group of studies that

have simultaneously addressed infants' memory for events and
their precipitating contingencies.
reinforcement paradigm

The conjugate

(Rovee and Fagen, 1976) was used in

these studies and has yielded robust measures of infant
memory.
The conjugate reinforcement paradigm uses foot-kicks as
the dependent variable.

It consists of two training

sessions 24 hours apart, and a third session, that assesses
long-term memory, can occur at any interval after session
two.

Each training session includes, 1) A three-minute

baseline period, to establish each infant's natural footkicking rate;

2) A nine-minute acquisition phase, in which

the infant can control the motion of a suspended mobile via
a cord connecting the infant's foot to the mobile;

3) A

three-minute extinction phase, in which the infant cannot
control the mobile.

The phases are one minute apart.

Foot-

kicks are recorded during each phase of both sessions.
The baseline phase of session two is compared to the
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extinction phase of session one to measure the infant's
retention of the contingency across the 24-hour retention
interval.
one,

The measured decrease in kicking from session

extinction to session two, baseline is an index of

forgetting.

Memory over a retention interval of more than

24 hours is assessed by comparing baseline of session three
to extinction of session two

(Rovee-Collier and Fagen,

1981).
Sullivan, Rovee-Collier and Tynes

(1979) employed this

paradigm to investigate long-term memory for a responsecontingent relationship in 3-month-olds.
two training sessions, 24 hours apart.
either 96,

144,

Subjects received
A third occurred

192, or 336 hours later, according to each

subject's condition.

Subjects showed nearly perfect

retention from session one to session two and demonstrated
long-term retention up to 192 hours, as indicated by no
significant decrease in response rate from session two,
phase three to session three, phase one.
interval of 336 hours
forgetting (i.e.,

Only after an

(14 days) did infants show significant

a significant decrease in response rate)

as indexed by foot-kicking rate comparisons.
Forgetting and memory retrieval in 2-month-olds was
further investigated by Greco, Rovee-Collier, Hayne,
Griesler and Earley (1986).

After two training sessions,

subjects received a retention interval of 1, 3,
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6 or 9 days.

Response rate was the dependant variable indicating
forgetting.

Two-month-olds showed complete forgetting after

a retention interval of more than one day, but showed memory
at one day.

That is, after retention intervals of more than

one day, 2-month-olds showed no increase response rates
above baseline levels during the long-term memory test.
In a second experiment, researchers reactivated memory
in 2-

and 3-month-olds after complete forgetting had

occurred in both groups.

Reactivation occurred 24 hours

prior to the long-term memory test and consisted of showing
the infants the same mobile used in the training sessions
for three minutes, during which the mobile moved noncontingently.

Researchers indexed the differential

contribution of the infants' age and the age of the memory
to retrieval abilities.

Infants were tested at 28 and 35

days, following training, using the same long-term memory
test procedure as above in order to explore the limits of
memory reactivation.

Results showed that reactivation was

successful at 28 days, but not 35 days, for the 3-month-old
group only.
after 28-

Two-month-olds showed no memory reactivation

or 35-day retention intervals.

Memory

reactivation in two-month-olds is apparently limited to an
18-day retention interval, as demonstrated by Davis and
Rovee-Collier

(1983) using the same procedure.

Long-term

reactivation results indicated that retrieval was impaired
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by the amount of time that passed between the onset of
forgetting and the presentation of the reminder.

In the 28-

day retention interval condition, the reminder was given on
the 27th day.

Thus, for 2-month-olds

(who show complete

forgetting after 24 hours) 26 days elapsed between
forgetting and the reminder.
after

14 days)

For 3-month-olds

only 13 days passed since

(who forgot

forgetting

occurred.
In summary, infants' ability to access memory for a
contingent relationship is a function of the amount of time
that has elapsed since the

"onset of forgetting."

Two-

month-olds show complete forgetting after periods of more
than one day, while in 3-month-olds memory persists up to
eight days.

Retrieval cues successfully reactivate memory

in 2-month-olds after a 18-day retention interval and in 3month-olds after as long as 28 days.
Retrieval is also impeded if reactivation cues are
sufficiently discrepant from the training stimulus
Collier, Patterson & Hayne, 1985).

(Rovee-

Though infants' memory

can be reactivated after forgetting has occurred,
substituting more than one component of the five-component
training mobile with a novel component produced ineffective
reactivation in 3-month-olds in a two-week long-term
retention test.

The same effects have been found with 2-

month-olds after a retention interval of only 24 hours
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(Hayne, Greco, Earley, Griesler & Rovee-Collier,

1986).

The duration and distribution of contingent experience
can also determine infants' abilities to remember
contingencies.

In a study with 2-month-olds

Morrongiello & Rovee-Collier, 1985),

(Linde,

researchers exposed

infants to two sessions, either one week or two weeks apart,
using the conjugate reinforcement paradigm.

Training phases

varied in duration such that infants received either 6, 12,
or 18 minutes of contingent experience.

Only infants who

received 18 minutes of training were able to remember the
contingency two weeks later.

In a second condition,

training duration was held constant at 18 minutes, and was
either distributed across three 6-minute training sessions
or was provided in one 18-minute training session.

The

results showed that only the infant who received the
distributed contingent experience were able to recall the
contingency two weeks later.
Finally, both 2- and 3-month-olds show response rates
significantly below baseline levels in a 24-hour retention
test when more than one novel component is substituted in
the mobile.

These results indicate that 2- and 3-month-old

infants are capable of encoding specific information about
the mobile during training and can detect discrepancies in
its components from the training to the reactivation phase.
Researchers studying contingency perception in infants
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have focused primarily on identifying the temporal and
spatial limits of this ability.

Several studies have

investigated the effects of visual displacement of stimuli
(Cavanagh & Davidson, 1977; Millar & Schaffer, 1972,
Millar, 1974,

1973;

&

1975) and rates of contingent reinforcement

(Watson, 1972 & 1979; Millar & Watson, 1979)

on infants'

ability to perceive and learn relationships which are
contingent on their behavior.

However, there is no research

designed to determine how contingency perception in infants
is affected when an event

is contingent on another person's

behavior and how this may affect memory.

For example, the

conjugate reinforcement paradigm has shown that an infant
can learn the contingency between kicking his/her leg and
the motion of a mobile suspended above his/her crib, as
indicated by a significant increase in response rate above
baseline.

Furthermore, memory for this contingent

relationship persists for eight days by 3 months of age.
However, if the same subject were to observe another person
causing the mobile to move in the same manner, would he/she
still be able to detect the contingency?

If so, would

memory for the contingency last as long as it would if
he/she had controlled the mobile him/herself?

These

questions are unanswered in the current literature.
Nevertheless, insight may be gained from literature found
under the headings of imitation and observational learning.
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Learning Contingencies Via Imitation
Certainly many contingent relations that an infant may
be exposed to are not contingent on the infant's own
behavior.

For example, when mom flicks the light switch

when leaving a room, the light turns off.

When dad winds-up

the bath tub toy it paddles around the tub.

These types of

experiences with contingent relations, though once removed
from the infant's own behavior, are nonetheless a potential
source of learning about actions and objects in the
environment.

Thus, another factor that may determine

whether an infant can learn and remember a contingent
relationship is if the contingency is dependent on his/her
own behavior or that of another person.

No research to

date, however, has directly addressed this issue.
If young infants can learn other-dependent contingent
relations, a prerequisite for this skill would likely be the
ability to learn object-action relations via observation.
While there is no literature on observational learning by
infants, the imitation literature indicates that infants can
learn and remember object-action relationships by observing
the behaviors of others.
Meltzoff

(1985) studied 14-

and 24-month-olds' ability

to imitate a simple action on a novel toy under immediate
and 24-hour deferred conditions.
assigned to the two conditions.
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Subjects were randomly
Within each group subjects

were assigned to one of three test conditions.

In the

"imitation" condition an experimenter modeled a target
behavior, pulling the toy apart and reassembling it.

This

was done three times in one 20-second presentation period.
In the "baseline" condition the toy was shown to the
subjects for 20 seconds, but the target behavior was not
modeled.

This condition controlled for spontaneous

production of the target behavior.

In the "activity-

control" condition an experimenter modeled a behavior that
was different from the target behavior three times
seconds.

in 20

This condition controlled for the possibility that

subjects might be more motivated to manipulate a toy if they
observed an adult touch it, and might thus have a greater
tendency to produce the target behavior.

Following

presentations, all subjects were given a 20-second response
period either immediately or 24 hours later.

During this

period observers scored whether or not subjects pulled the
toy apart and measured the latency of the response if it was
produced.

Strong evidence for imitation was obtained only

for infants in the

imitation test condition on immediate and

24-hour delayed tests.
12-

A significantly high percentage of

and 14-month-old infants in the imitation condition, as

compared with the two control conditions, displayed the
target behavior on immediate and 24-hour delayed tests.
Subjects in the

imitation condition had lower mean latency
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scores than subjects in the two control conditions.

These

results were consistent across age and deferred groups.
Furthermore, there were no significant differences between
subjects in immediate and deferred imitation groups.

This

study indicated that infants as young as 14 months of age
were able to recall and reproduce target behaviors
immediately and 24 hours after observing the behavior.
Meltzoff suggests that imitation may thereby play a role in
learning and socialization during infancy.
Meltzoff

(1988a) investigated the ability of 9-month-

olds to imitate actions on novel objects under immediate and
24-hour delay conditions.

Infants in immediate and 24-hour

delay groups were shown a series of three target actions on
three novel test objects.

Each action was demonstrated

three times during a 20-second modeling period before moving
on to the next action and object.

Following this, half of

the subjects were given an immediate imitation test and half
were given the same test 24 hours later.

Subjects were

presented the same objects, one at a time, in their original
sequence.

Subjects were allowed a series of three 20-second

response periods, starting from the subjects' first touch of
the object.

Three control groups were used.

The "baseline"

group did not experience the imitation periods.

This group

controlled for the probability of spontaneous production of
the target action.

The "adult-touching" group observed an
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adult hold the object during the modeling period but was not
shown the target actions.

This condition controlled for the

possibility that subjects might be induced to produce the
target actions by seeing an adult approach and touch the
object.

The "adult-manipulation" group observed adults

perform actions on the object that were different from the
target actions, but produced the same consequence
object beeped or rattled).

(i.e. the

This group controlled for the

possibility that infants who see that objects have
consequences may be more motivated to perform actions on
them.
Results indicated that 9-month-old infants are capable
of both immediate and 24-hour delayed imitation.

Infants

in

both imitation groups produced significantly more target
behaviors than control groups.

The fact that 50 percent of

infants in both the immediate and deferred imitation groups
were assessed "high" imitation scores, meaning that they
produced at least two of the three target behaviors, is
particularly interesting.

This suggests that the ability of

9-month-olds to imitate simple action on novel objects is
persistent across a delay of 24 hours. Furthermore, the task
in this study was more difficult and can be considered to
require more memory than the task in the previous Meltzoff
(1985)

study.

Meltzoff

(1985)

required

that

subjects

only one action-object pairing, while there were three
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recall

action-object pairings in the Meltzoff

(1988a) study.

Thus,

subjects in the latter study had more information to process
and recall on the test and potentially had interference from
one task to the next.
However, caution should be exercised when comparing the
results of the above two studies.
Meltzoff

The results of the

(1985) study showed that infants as young as 14

months of age were able to imitate novel actions on objects.
Meltzoff

(1988a) extended these findings to 9-month-olds.

However, the tasks were different in the two studies.

The

1985 study tested subjects' ability to imitate a novel
action on a familiar object.

The 1988a study tested 9-

month-olds' ability to perform familiar actions on novel
objects.

Thus, direct comparisons cannot be drawn between

these two studies.

It may be, for example, that at nine

months of age objects are more salient to infants than
actions.

Thus, performing a familiar action on a novel

object may be easier than performing a novel action on a
familiar object for 9-month-old infants.

If so,

Meltzoff

(1988a) may have made the task disproportionately easy for
subjects when compared with Meltzoff

(1985).

An alternate

hypothesis is that it is simply easier to imitate familiar
actions than nonfamiliar actions.

However, it is also

important to note that the 9-month-olds had to imitate three
different actions on three different objects, while 14-and
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24-month-olds had to imitate only one novel action on one
object.

Thus,

the task for 9-month-olds may have required

more memory than did the task required of 14olds.

and 24-month-

The results of the 9-month-olds are, thus, very

robust, particularly since they were successful at the task
even after a 24-hour delay.
Meltzoff

(1988d) used the same procedure to investigate

14-month-olds' ability to imitate novel actions and to defer
imitation up to one week.

Infants were shown a series of

six objects and their corresponding actions.

One of the

actions was novel and consisted of touching a box with one's
forehead in order to make a light come on inside.
five actions were familiar.

The other

The purpose of the novel action

was to broaden the range of acts previously studied with 14month-olds to include novel actions.

Results showed that

infants in the imitation condition produced significantly
more target behaviors than did subjects in the

"baseline" or

"adult-manipulation" control conditions after one week.
These studies by Meltzoff have important implications
for infant memory.

Results of the 9-month-olds

(Meltzoff,

1988a) indicate that infants of this age are able to
recognize objects after a 24-hour retention interval, after
only 20 seconds of familiarization.

These infants were also

able to recall object-action relationships after 24 hours,
with only three exposures to the target behavior during the
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same 20-second familiarization period.

By 14 months of age,

infants were shown to recall novel actions after delays as
long as one week.

This indicates that infants as young as 9

months are able to learn object-action relationships via
observation and that memory for these relationships is very
robust.
A study by Abravanel, Levan-Goldschmidt and Stevenson
(1976) indicated that actions on objects may be more salient
to 6- to 18-month-old infants than actions without objects.
A series of 22 actions were modeled for 6-,
18-month-olds.

9-,

12-,

15- and

Thirteen of these were simple actions

performed on common objects, three were actions without
objects which the subjects could see themselves do

(e.g.,

pat-a-cake) and six were actions without objects which
subjects could not see themselves do
mouth).

(e.g., open and close

Subjects were given the opportunity to imitate each

action immediately after it was modeled.

A control group

received no modeling, but were given each of the materials
for the actions on objects for one minute and were observed
for five minutes to assess spontaneous production of actions
without objects.

Results showed that subjects who received

modeling produced the target action significantly more than
did control subjects.

There were significant increases in

imitation across age for most actions between 9 and 12
months of age.

Overall, however, actions on objects were
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imitated more than actions that subjects could not see
themselves perform.
Abravanel and Gingold

(1985) investigated deferred

imitation in 12- and 18-month-olds on three types of
"object-related actions."
tasks"

The actions were "single/simple

(e.g., placing a crown on a doll's head),

"reiterative tasks"

(e.g.,

stacking differently shaped

blocks in a particular order) and "sequentially coordinated
tasks"

(e.g., creating a rapid two-tone series on a

xylophone).

Tasks were individually selected on the basis

that the infant could not perform the target action during a
pretest screening.

Subjects were then assigned to either a

"modeling" condition for which the target action for each
task was produced twice by an experimenter or a

"control"

condition for which no modeling was provided, but was
allowed to handle the stimuli for 10 additional seconds.
Ten minutes later, all subjects were given a deferred posttest in which they were again given the stimulus materials
A significantly higher

for each task for 60 seconds.
percent of subjects

in the modeling condition produced the

target action than did controls for all actions except
"blocks" and "xylophone."

It may be that by 12 months of

age infants have had sufficient exposure to similar tasks so
that the target behaviors are already in their repertoire.
A

significantly greater percentage of 18-month-olds than 12-
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month-olds performed all "simple/single" action tasks and
"reiterative" action tasks on the post-test.
significant

age effects

for the

"xylophone",

sequentially-coordinated actions.

There were no
one of two

All subjects in control

and modeling groups who did not pass the post-test were
given an immediate imitation phase directly after the posttest.

In this phase subjects saw the same tasks as before

modeled twice and were allowed 60 seconds to reproduce each
target behavior.

Thus, subjects who previously served as

controls during the deferred imitation test, as well as
subjects in the modeling condition who failed the test,
became experimental subjects for the immediate test.

Fewer

than 50 percent of 12-month-old infants in the immediate
imitation condition were able to imitate any of the actions,
while 18-month-olds were successful at most actions.

Also,

there were no significant differences between experimental
and control groups at either age.

These results are

inconsistent with those obtained by Meltzoff

(1988a), which

showed that 9-month-old infants could imitate simple actions
on novel objects with delays of up to 24 hours.
due to differences in procedures or tasks.

This may be

For example,

Abravanel and Gingold included only subjects who did not
pass the deferred post-test and control subjects in the
immediate imitation group, rather than randomly assigning
new subjects for the immediate imitation group, as did
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Meltzoff.

This procedure may have stacked the odds against

the immediate imitation group in Abravanel and Gingold's
study by sampling a nonrepresentative group of subjects who
had poor imitation skills.
The literature cited above indicates that 6-month-old
infants can imitate simple actions on objects and do so more
readily than they imitate simple facial gestures that they
cannot see themselves perform.

By 9 months infants are able

to imitate novel actions on objects up to 24 hours after
modeling has occurred and

by 12 months of age, they can

imitate tasks of increasing difficulty, such as sequentially
coordinated actions.

Fourteen-month-olds can imitate novel

actions on objects with delays of up to one week and they
can delay imitation of actions on novel objects for 24
hours.

These results with 14-month-olds indicate that

memory for the action and the object of that action can
persist for extended periods of time.
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Chapter III
SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE
The above literature review indicates that infants are
capable of detecting a contingent relationship between their
behavior and the subsequent occurrence of an event.

Several

factors contribute to an infant's ability to perceive
contingencies:

temporal contiguity between the infant's

behavior and the contingent stimulus event, the rate, delay,
and consistency with which the contingent stimulus event
follows the behavior, and visual displacement of the
contingent stimulus event from the infant's line of sight.
Furthermore, the current literature suggests that
contingency perception is tied to infants' memory capacity
during initial learning.

However, once a contingency is

learned, infants have shown persistent memory for contingent
relationships.
Two-month-olds show memory up to one day and 3-montholds up to eight days after two training sessions with a
When given a retrieval cue,

response-contingent stimulus.

two-month-olds display memory for contingencies up to 14
days, and 3-month-olds up to 28 days.

In addition, 2-

and

3-month-old infants have displayed sensitivity to changes in
contingent-feedback stimuli on long-term retention tests.
Further, a 40 percent discrepancy in appearance between a
response-contingent stimulus used during training and one
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presented to an infant on a subsequent memory test, resulted
in response rates that were significantly below baseline
rates.

This indicates that infants encode specific

information about the features of contingent

stimuli.

The literature also indicates that the ability to detect
and learn contingencies is present by two months of age,
suggesting that infants may be predisposed to readily
develop this skill.

Contingency perception may thus be an

ecologically adaptive ability.

If so, infants may be more

attuned to information about contingent events, or may be
more stimulated to learn about contingent than noncontingent
events.

This area of perception is largely unexplored.

Much research has focused on infants' abilities to
perceive contingencies.

However, there is no empirical

evidence regarding the subsequent memory for contingent
versus noncontingent events and objects.

Infants may, for

example, remember contingent objects longer than
noncontingent objects.

If,

in fact, contingent and

noncontingent relationships are differentially processed or
encoded, it would have several implications for the study of
For example, if memory for

infant cognitive development.

contingency is more robust or lasts longer than memory for
noncontingent events, researchers should move on to find out
why.

One possibility is that contingencies may be more

reinforcing, may provide more information about events or
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objects or may simply be more arousing than noncontingent
events or objects.

This is suggested in the literature.

Several studies discussed above have shown that
contingency produces a greater amount of positive affect
than does noncontingent exposure to the same stimuli
(Gunnar, 1980;

Gunnar-Vongnechten, 1978;

Brooks-Gunn, 1985; Watson & Ramey, 1969).

Lewis, Sullivan &
Also, at least

one study has demonstrated that infants will engage in a
contingent task longer than a noncontingent task

(Lewis,

Sullivan & Brooks-Gunn, 1985).
Furthermore, teaching strategies may be modified to be
more effective if contingency is found to better facilitate
For instance, Watson, Hayes

memory for learned behaviors.
and Vietze

(1982) used the principles of contingent

reinforcement as intervention for a developmentally delayed
infant.

The subject's motor skills improved and there was

evidence that she learned to discriminate instrumental
contingencies after a four-month period in which the subject
experienced response-contingent stimulation.

This study

points to a need for further investigation of responsecontingent reinforcement programs as possible treatments for

developmentally delayed children.
The following research focused on infants' abilities to
learn and remember the relationship between their actions
and the contingent occurrence of a dynamic stimulus event.
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Differential

memory for contingent versus noncontingent

stimulus events was also assessed.
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Chapter IV
METHODOLOGY
The literature shows that infants are capable of
encoding and retrieving information about contingent events
(Sullivan, Rovee-Collier & Tynes,

1979; Greco, Rovee-

Collier, Hayne, Griesler & Earley, 1986 & Davis & RoveeCollier, 1983)

and that relationships between actions and

objects can be learned via imitation
1985;

(Abravanel & Gingold,

Abravanel, Levan-Goldschmidt & Stevenson, 1976;

Meltzoff 1985, 1988a & 1988d).

However, there are several

gaps in the contingency literature.

For example, it is not

known how behavior-contingent experience with a stimulus
interacts with memory for the contingency.
questions may be asked in this regard:

1)

At least two
Do infants

remember objects that they can control better than objects
that they cannot control, 2) Do infants show different
temporal patterns of memory for objects versus actions?
Another compelling reason to study the relationship
between contingency learning and memory is the potentially
adaptive implications of remembering contingencies.
infants are exposed to an array of

Most

individuals from birth.

Some of those persons will be care providers and will
respond contingently to the infant's solicitations for care
(e.g., mom, dad, grandmother).

Other individuals to whom

the infant may be exposed, even on a regular basis, may not
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respond to the infants solicitations for care
older sibling, a neighbor).

(e.g., an

It would seem beneficial for

the infant to learn and remember, for example, who will feed
him/her when he/she produces a 'hunger' cry.
ability to remember care providers
contingent stimulation),

Thus, the

(i.e., the providers of

perhaps better than other persons

not falling into this category, may prepare the infant to
function more effectively in his/her environment.

If so,

remembering contingent relationships better than
noncontingent ones may be ecologically adaptive.
Infants may be predisposed to pay more attention to
stimuli that provide contingent feedback than to
noncontingent stimuli.

Therefore, infants who experience

behavior-contingent presentations of an event may be able to
retain information about that event longer than would be
possible given an equal amount of noncontingent exposure to
the event.
The area of contingency perception and learning by
infants offers divers lines of research which may be
pursued.

The following research was conducted to broaden

the knowledge base with regard to the relationship between
infant memory and operant behavioral contingencies.

The

objective of the present study was to determine if there are
differences in infants' memory for behavior-contingent
versus noncontingent dynamic objects and for behavior-
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contingent objects versus the controlling behavior.

Two

research questions were addressed.
First, does having control over a dynamic object

(i.e.

contingency) result in longer memory for that object when
compared to a non-controllable object?

It was predicted

that having control over a dynamic object would help infants
to remember that object better than if the object were not
controllable.

The additional interactive property of

contingency may provide another aspect of the object to be
remembered.

For example, in addition to remembering, "This

is the object that I saw,"

contingent relationships may also

provide the opportunity to remember, "This is the object
that I turned off and on."

In other words, the contingent

aspect of the object may be another feature, in addition to
its shape, color, size and texture, etc. that the infant can
remember.

Thus, contingency may function as an additional

retrieval cue at the time of recall.
Another possibility is that having control over an
object makes it more interesting.

The infant may thus

attend more to the features of contingent objects versus
noncontingent objects.

This may, in turn, better facilitate

memory for the contingent object.

However, a competing

hypothesis is that not having control over a stimulus might
make that stimulus more intriguing than one which can be
controlled.

Once the infant learns a contingent
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relationship between his/her behavior and the onset of a
dynamic event, the object/source of that
becomes predictable for the infant.

stimulation

On the other hand,

objects that provide noncontingent and randomly timed
stimulation are not predictable.

This factor of

unpredictability may make noncontingent sources of
stimulation more compelling to look at for the infant.

If

so, infants may be more attentive to noncontingent stimuli,
which may, in turn, facilitate more persistent memory for
the noncontingent stimulus than for the contingent stimulus.
The second research question addressed by this study
was, do infants have long-term memory for the action which
produces the contingent event?

The conjugate reinforcement

studies by Rovee-Collier and her colleagues have clearly
shown that young infants show memory for the controlling
behavior for at least eight days.

However, in the conjugate

reinforcement paradigm, the infant controls the mobile via a
cord that is attached to his/her foot and the mobile.

Thus,

the mechanism for producing the contingent feedback connects
the infant directly to the source of contingent feedback.
In essence, the infant manipulates the mobile directly.
It is possible, for instance, that infants in a mobile
conjugate reinforcement procedure do not realize that the
cord tied to their feet functions as a manipulandum by which
to move the mobile.

Evidence of this is suggested by the
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phase and the familiar stimulus object was placed on the
pedestal.

During the action test, the familiar stimulus

object was not activated, regardless of the subject's
actions on the manipulanda.

The test lasted for 60 seconds,

beginning with the first action on either of the
manipulanda.

The dependent variable for this test was the

proportion of target actions relative to target plus nontarget actions.

Following the action test, the familiar

stimulus object was removed.

The reminder phase then

followed.
Reminder.

The beginning of the reminder phase was

marked by an experimenter introducing her hands through the
screen and clapping three times.

The experimenter then

placed the familiar stimulus object on the pedestal once
again.

The purpose of this phase is to overcome possible

extinction effects of the test phase on the learning of the
contingency

(for subjects in the contingent groups).

That

is, the test phase essentially exposed all subjects to the
stimulus object for two minutes, during which the object
could not be controlled.

This could have functioned as an

extinction phase for subjects in contingent groups.

Thus,

all subjects were given an additional 15-cumulative seconds
of familiarization to the stimulus object during the
reminder phase.

This phase was run exactly like the

familiarization phase for all subjects.
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The yoked procedure

described for the familiarization phase was also employed
during the reminder phase.
One-week return.

The second visit to the lab consisted

of a second memory for the object test, which differed from
the first only in that a third stimulus served as the novel
object.

This was followed by a second memory for the action

test, which was identical to the first.
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Results

Memory for the object
During the short-term (10 min,)

novelty-familiarity

preference memory test, subjects in both groups looked at
the stimulus objects an average of 38.8 seconds

(SD = 10.6)

of the allotted 60 seconds during the test trials.

Thus,

subjects looked 65 percent of the available time to the
objects.

During the long-term

(one week) memory test,

subjects looked to the stimuli an average of 41.8 seconds
(SD = 10.4).
seconds.

This was 70 percent of the available 60

A one-way ANOVA on Condition

(contingent vs.

noncontingent) was run on the total amount of time the
subjects spent fixating the stimuli across both memory
tests.

This analysis revealed no significant effect of

Condition

(F 1

22

=

0.18,

p >

.10).

The proportion of total looking time

(PTLT) that

subjects spent fixating the novel stimulus object was the
used to index memory for the familiar stimulus object during
the novelty-familiarity preference tests.

PTLT scores

reflect the average proportion of looking to the novel
stimulus across the two test trials.

Each subject, thus,

generated two PTLT scores, one for the short-term memory
test and one for the long-term memory test.
Two hypotheses were made regarding subjects' performance
on this measure:

1) only subjects in contingent condition
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were predicted to show

(long-term) memory for the familiar

stimulus after the one-week retention interval, 2) infants
in both conditions were predicted to show (short-term)
memory for the familiar stimulus after the 10-minute
retention interval.

To test these hypotheses, a repeated-

measures ANOVA was conducted on Condition X Time on PTLT to
the novel stimulus.

Although a significant Condition by

Time interaction was predicted, the ANOVA test indicated no
significant interaction
also no main effect
(F1,22 =.22,

(F

22

=

.41,

of Condition

p >.10).

Independent

p >

.10).

(El2 2 =.73,

t-tests

There was
p>

.10)

or Time

on PTLT scores,

for each condition at each retention interval, against a
chance

level

of looking

also failed

(.50)

to yield

The result of this test indicated that

significant results.

subjects had no preference for either the familiar or novel
stimulus

(t23 = 0.667, p >.10) .

Table 3 shows the means

and standard deviations for subjects in both conditions
across time.
The obtained results were not expected.

However, if

subjects demonstrated transient memory across test trials,
it is possible that averaging PTLT scores across trials
masked this effect.

Thus, a repeated-measures ANOVA on

Condition X Trials was conducted, on PTLT scores for the
four trials across both tests.
Condition

(Fl, 22

=

0.75,

p >

.10)
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Again, no main effects for
or Trial

(0 1 ,22 = 1.03,

p

>

.10) were found, nor was there a significant interaction
(f1,22 = 0.25, p >

.10).

Separate repeated-measures ANOVA

tests for each test on Condition X Trial also failed to
reach significance.
Secondary analyses were conducted to rule out the
effects of possible confounding variables.

In order to

determine if there was a preference for one of the three
stimuli, the proportion of time the subjects spent fixating
each of the three stimulus objects was calculated
the two memory test).

(across

The mean proportion of time subjects

(N=24) spent fixating the red, blue and yellow objects was
.56

(SD

=

.13),

respectively.

.49
A

(SD

=

.13)

and .46

(SD =

.10)

repeated measures ANOVA on PTLT by Color

indicated significant differences among these means
3.26, p

<.05).

(F24,

=

Post-hoc independent t-tests revealed a

significant difference between the proportion of time
infants fixated the red versus the yellow stimulus objects
(t23 = 2.70,

p <

significantly.

No other means differed

.05).

Independent t-test against a chance level of

.50 was run across conditions on the proportion of time the
subjects fixated the stimulus on the right for each of the
object memory tests.

No significant side bias was found on

either the short-term memory test
>

0.72, p
.15

ta3

=

(M =

.48, SD =

.10) or the long-term memory test
0.20,

p > .10).
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(M =

.121,

23 =

.51, SD

=

In summary, the analyses of the object test data failed
to support the main hypotheses.

Furthermore, no evidence of

recognition memory was shown by the subjects on either of
the two memory tests.

It is unlikely that the 7.5- to 8-

month-old subjects were not able to recall the appearance of
the familiar object.

Alternative explanations for this

result are discussed in Chapter 6.
Memory for the action
The proportion of target actions

(PTA) was used as the

dependent variable in order to assess the subjects'
preferences for the target manipulandum across each phase of
the experiment

(i.e., baseline, familiarization, action test

1 and action test 2).

PTA scores were calculated by

dividing the total number of target actions in each phase by
the total number of actions on both manipulanda during that
phase.

A one-way ANOVA by Condition was run on baseline PTA

scores to establish that there were no initial differences
between the conditions.

As predicted, subjects in the

contingent and noncontingent groups performed similarly
during the baseline phase

(F1 22 = 0.90, p >

.10).

The means

and standard deviations for PTA scores across phases are
reported for each group in Table 4.
In order to assess contingency learning, baseline PTA
scores were subtracted from familiarization PTA scores and
difference scores were obtained.
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Only subjects in the

contingent condition were predicted to show learning of the
contingency.

This hypothesis was supported by the results

of independent t-tests on difference scores against zero.
The subjects in the contingent group significantly increased
the number of target actions
familiarization

(M =

from baseline to

.25, SD =

.26, t = 3.125, p <

.01),

indicating that they learned the action-object relation.
Subjects in the noncontingent group showed no increase in
target actions

(M

=

.00,

SD = .38, t = 0.00,

p >

.10).

However, a one-way ANOVA indicated only a marginally
significant
p =

difference

.08).

between the group means

(F, 22 = 3.48,

This was expected given the large standard

deviations in both groups.
Difference scores were calculated for PTA scores for the
short-term (10 min.)
tests.
Phase

and long-term

(one week) action memory

A repeated measures ANOVA was run on Condition X
(familiarization, action test 1 and action test 2)

with difference scores against baseline as the repeated

dependent variable.
(see Table 4),

Although group means appeared to differ

the standard deviations were very high, and

no significant effects were found in this analysis.
Because of the variability that difference
scores
against baseline contributed to the data,
the same analysis
was conducted on PTA scores.

Subjects in the contingent

condition were predicted to have consistently
higher PTA
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scores than subjects in the noncontingent condition.

To

test this hypothesis a repeated measures ANOVA was run on
Condition X Phase on with PTA scores as the repeated
dependent variable.
Condition

(F,

22 =

This analysis revealed a main effect of

20.25,

p <

.001).

There was no main

effect of Phase or a Condition by Phase interaction.

The

results of the two above analyses suggest that baseline PTA
scores were highly variable, thus, the use of difference
scores obscured real differences between the groups on PTA
scores.
Subjects in the contingent condition were expected to
demonstrate

short-

(10

minutes)

and long-term

(one week)

memory for the target action as indexed PTA scores
significantly above

.50 during the action tests.

Subjects

in the noncontingent conditions were expected to demonstrate
nonsignificant PTA scores across the two tests since
there
was no contingency for them to remember.
tests against

Independent t-

.50 supported the above hypothesis.

Table 4

shows that subjects in the contingent condition
maintained
PTA scores significantly higher than .50 during
the shortterm and long-term memory for the action
tests.

However,

the PTA scores of subjects in the noncontingent
group failed
to reach significance on either test.
Independent

t-tests

were also run on difference scores

in order to test if subjects maintained
PTA scores above
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baseline levels.
Table 4,

The results of these tests, also shown in

reveal that subjects in the contingent condition

maintained significantly higher than baseline levels of
target actions on the short-term memory test, but not on the
long-term memory test.

This is likely due to a large amount

of variability during baseline, which is included in the
difference score.

Subjects in the noncontingent group

showed no significant levels of target actions relative to
baseline on either memory test.
Collectively, the above results indicate that there was
no initial difference in PTA scores between the conditions
during baseline.

However, subjects in the contingent

condition learned the object-action relationship during
familiarization and were able to recall it 10 minutes and
one week after original learning.

Subjects in the

noncontingent condition showed only random and
nonsignificant action preferences throughout the action
phases of the experiment.
Secondary analyses were conducted to rule out
confounding variables.

A repeated measures ANOVAs were run

on Target Action X Phase and Target Side X Phase for PTA
scores during baseline, familiarization and both memory
tests to determine if subjects had a manipulandum or side
(i.e., the lateral position of the target manipulandum)
preference.

The results of these tests revealed no main

66

effects

of Target Action

Side

(E,22

=

differences

.03, p =

(FE

.86) .

22

=

.00,

Also,

p =

.96)

or Target

ANOVAs revealed no sex

in PTA scores across phases

(F122

=

.21,

p

=

.66).
Interobserver Reliability

VTisual preference data.

Interobserver reliability was

calculated on the PTLT scores of 11
randomly-selected subjects.

(46 % of the sample)

A secondary observer who was

unaware of the condition to which subjects were assigned
observed the short-term
test.
fixating
trial.

(10 min.)

memory for the object

The proportion of total looking time subjects spent
the novel stimulus

(PTLT)

was calculated for each

PTLT scores derived from the observations of the

secondary and primary observers were subjected to a Pearson
Product-Moment correlation yielding 98 percent reliability.
Action data.

The action data of the same 10 subjects

was used to calculate interobserver reliability for the
subjects actions on the manipulanda.

A secondary observer

recorded the number of actions on each of the two
manipulanda throughout the experiment.
target actions
experiment

The proportion of

(PTA) was calculated for each phase of the

(baseline, familiarization, action test 1,

reminder and action test 2).

Pearson Product-Moment

correlations were run on PTA scores derived from the
observations of the secondary and primary observers for each
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phase individually and across phases.

Across phases, inter-

observer agreement was 96 percent reliable.

Correlations

for individual phases range are shown in Table 5.
Data from

dropped

and attrition sublects

Primary analyses were conducted on the memory for the
object data and the memory for the action data of the
subjects who were dropped from the experiment.

12

This was

done to ensure that subject loss was not selective and thus
did not bias the data.

A repeated measures ANOVA on

Condition X Time for PTLT scores failed to yield significant
main effects
= .31,

of Condition

P = .59)

(F1 1 0 =

or an interaction

.31,

p =

.59)

(F1 1 0 = .26,

or Time
p

=

(F,

0

.62).

Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 6.
A repeated measures ANOVA on Condition X Phase for PTA
scores also failed to yield
=

1.35, P

=

interaction

.27)

or Phase

(F1 1 0 =

.93,

and standard deviations.

a main effect
(F1 10

p =

=

.45).

.74, p

of Condition
=

.57)

(E1 10

or an

See Table 7 for means

The same analyses were run

collapsing the data from the subjects who were dropped from
the experiment with those of the final sample

(N=36).

Again, no significant effects were revealed.

Thus, subjects

who were dropped from the experiment and did not differ from
the final sample with respect to visual preferences during
the object memory tests or PTA scores across phases.
The data generated by attrition subjects on the first
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day of testing was collapsed with that of the final
and primary analyses were again conducted.

sample

This resulted in

a group of 19 subjects in the contingent condition and 15
subjects in the noncontingent condition

(N = 34).

The data

for the first object memory test were subjected to a one-way
ANOVA by Condition on PTLT scores to the novel stimulus.

As

in the original analysis of the final sample data, no
significant preferences were found.

The same analysis with

the data generated by attrition subjects only also revealed
no significant effect.
level of

Independent t-tests against a chance

.50 were run by condition on the combined data of

the final sample and attrition subject.
these analyses are presented in Table 8.

The results of
No significant

effects were found.
A Condition X Phase

(familiarization and action test 1)

repeated measures ANOVA on PTA scores revealed no
significant

effect

of condition

(F,

32

= 2,74,

p >

.05).

This was inconsistent with the results of the main analyses
on the final sample data.

The discrepancy may have been due

to the fact that the Condition X Phase repeated measures for
final sample included three phases, whereas it was only
possible to include two phases

for the analysis with

attrition data because infants who did not return for the
second visit did not receive the second memory test.

This

same analysis on the data generated by attrition subjects
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only

(N = 10)

failed

the above analyses
attrition
final

to yield
it

significant

may be concluded that

did not contribute to the effects
data sample.
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results.

Based on

subject
found in the

Discussion
The results of this

study provide valuable and

previously unavailable information about 7.5- to 8-montholds' memory for contingent versus noncontingent events.
The mobile conjugate reinforcement studies have shown that
3-month-old infants can remember how to control an object
for up to eight days following 18 minutes of conjugate
training

(Sullivan, Rovee-Collier & Tynes, 1979).

Although

the present study was conducted with 7.5- to 8-month-old
subjects, the paradigm employed here afforded subjects, on
average, only 2.5 minutes of training.

Also, the training

situation in the present study required subjects to
discriminate among two potential operants
possible controlling actions).

(i.e.,

two

Subjects in the contingent

group learned which of two actions controlled an object and
they subsequently displayed long-term memory for that action
one week later.

These results are consistent with those of

Sullivan, Rovee-Collier and Tynes

(1979) and extend the

findings to a different testing paradigm.
However, in the current study memory for the object
itself was not evident, regardless of whether the infants
Thus, there was no evidence

controlled the object or not.

to support the hypothesis that controllable objects would be
remembered longer than uncontrollable ones.

This result is

somewhat inconsistent with those of Rovee-Collier, Patterson
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and Hayne

(1985).

Using the mobile conjugate reinforcement

paradigm, these authors

found that a test mobile different

from the training mobile resulted in significantly decreased
response rates among 2- and 3-month-olds 24 hours after
training.

This suggests that infants were able discriminate

the novel mobile from the training mobile, which requires
memory of the training mobile itself.

Therefore, in the

present study it is remarkable that 7.5-

to 8-month-old

infants showed no memory for the stimulus object either at
10 minutes or one week after training.
These results raise interesting questions regarding the
effects of contingent experience on memory, as assessed by
the novelty preference method, and infants' perceptions of
contingency.

There are three possible explanations for

such findings:

1) the stimulus objects were not

discriminable to the infants, 2) the infants did not
remember the familiar stimulus at either 10 minutes or one
week after familiarization, or 3) the conditions of the
study did not facilitate subjects' demonstrating memory for
the stimulus objects.

Of the three alternatives, the third

seems most likely, given the age of the subjects.
There are several reasons why the conditions of the study
may have contributed to the obtained anomalous results.
First, perhaps interest in the nature of the object was
overshadowed by the subjects' strong interest in the
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manipulanda.

The presence of the manipulanda during the

familiarization phase may have distracted infants from
noticing the appearance of the stimulus objects, such that
memory for the object was inhibited.

Second, the 1-minute

cumulative familiarization time that the subjects received
with the familiar stimulus object may not have been
sufficient to produce a significant novelty preference.
Third, it may be that the effects of contingency interact
with memory such that the visual preference method is not
suitable for detecting infants' memory for the familiar

stimulus object.

Specifically, there may be a competing

tendency for infants of this age to look at novel stimuli
versus stimuli which they were previously able to control.
Although subjects in the noncontingent condition did not
control the stimulus, their actions on the manipulanda often
coincided with the activation of the stimulus object.

Thus,

some subjects in the noncontingent group may have perceived
that they controlled the stimulus even though they did not.
If so, then in terms of the effect of contingency on memory,
the two treatment groups did not differ.

Future studies

should clarify the nature of the interaction between
contingency perception and memory.
The fact that infants in the contingent condition showed
long-term memory for the controlling action though they
failed to show memory for the object of their control is
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notable.

Perhaps by 7.5 months of age infants attend more

to actions, or objects that can be acted upon, rather than
visual stimuli per se.

Further research is needed to

establish the temporal limits of action memory under the
conditions of this study.
In conclusion, the research presented above raises
several questions regarding the role of contingency
perception in memory.

Though the hypothesis that infants

would remember controllable objects longer than noncontrollable objects was not supported, the results of this
study are inconclusive with respect to the cause of null
findings.

This research also introduces a new paradigm for

testing infants' memory for contingencies.
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Figure

1.

Red, blue and yellow stimulus obiects, from left

to right.

80

Figure 2.

Apparatus from the infant's perspective.
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Table 1.

Between- and within-subiects independent variables and
levels.

Independent
Variables

Between

Levels

Condition

Contingent
Noncontingent

Within

Retention

10 minutes

Interval

One week
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Table 2.
Complete counterbalancing of between-subjects independent
variables and levels

Variable

Condition

(N= 24).

Levels

N

Contingent

12

Noncontingent

12

Target

Pull Lever

12

Action

Turn Wheel

12

Action

Left

12

Side

Right

12

Stimulus

Red

8

Object

Blue

8

Yellow

8
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Table 3.
Means and standard deviations for subiects in both

conditions across time

(N =

24).
Condition

Contingent

10 minutes

M=
SD=

Noncontingent

M=

.516
.146

SD=

.528
.145

Time

1 week

M=
SD=

M=

.476

SD=

.106
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.535
.136

Table 4.
ANOVA and t-test results for PTA and difference scores.
Condition
Noncontingent
Contingent

Phase
Baseline

t

.41
(.23)
t= 1.28

.50
(.24)
= 0.00

.41
(.28)

.75
(.16)

Familiarization

**

t = 3.12

t

2.25

t

Test 1 Diff

=

t

*

.48
(.32)
t = 0.22

t

*

*

NOTE:
*
**
***

0.19

t

.12
(.33)
= 1.0
.07
(.50)

0.34

t

1.70

=

0.00

0.50

T-tests on difference scores were against zero.

p <
p <
p

=

<

.05
.01
.001
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3.48

=

(.33)
t

3.02

t

.17

Test 2 Diff

1.71

0.30

.00
(.38)

3.12

.18
(.28)
= 3.00

=

*

.25
(.26)

Diff

13.15 ***

.53
(.33)

.67
(.21)
t =2.83

Action Test 2

Fa.

=

0.90

t = 1.12

.68
(.20)

Action Test 1

F

Table 6.
PTLT scores on memory for the obi ect tests

were droped from the exeriment (N

=

for subjeacts who

12)}

Condition
Contingent

10 minutes

Object

Noncontingent

n=

9

M =

.512

M=

SD=

.188

SD=

n=

3
.539
.210

test

1 week

n = 9

n =

M=

M=

SD=

.498

SD=

.101
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3
.582
.139

Table 5.

Pearson product moment correlations of primary and secondary
observer PTA scores across

thases.

Phase

r

Baseline

.95

Familiarization

.94

Action test

.93

1

Reminder

1.0

Action test 2

.99

Overall

.96
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Table 8.
Mean PTLT scores on the first
ffinal sample and attrit ionu

memory for oblect test for the
ubects

(

=

35}

Condition
Contingent

Noncontingent

n

=

20

n

=

M

=

.543

M

=

SD=

.175

SD=

t

15

t=.44

= 1.11

89

.481
.166

